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HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY
1 INTRODUCTION
With a few exceptions, economic theory as well as empirical research have treated households as if
they were single consumers. As a practical matter, indeed, household expenditure data commonly
used in empirical research may report the composition of households without disaggregating house-
holdconsumption(expenditure)andfactorsupply(income)withrespecttohouseholdmembers. Both
from a normative and a positive perspective, this prevailing practice raises the question whether it
makes any difference who participates in the market, households as entities or household members
individually. Such considerations have attracted renewed attention after the widely acclaimed article
by Chiappori (1988a) who presents a model of collective rationality of households as an alternative
to the neoclassical model where households are treated like single consumers. See also the surveys
by Bourguignonand Chiappori (1992) and Kapteyn and Koreman (1992).
The normative issue is optimality: Will competitive exchange among households as entities lead
to a Pareto-optimal allocation? The answer is in the afﬁrmative as long as each household makes an
optimalchoice subject toits budgetconstraintand, by doingso, exhausts itsbudget. Moreover, under
the same assumptions, a corresponding core inclusion result can be derived, if a modiﬁed notion of
the core reﬂects competition among householdsinstead of individuals.
Non-optimal equilibrium allocations can occur even in economies consisting exclusively of one-
person households, provided that some consumers possess satiation points in the interior of their
budget sets whereas other consumers have non-satiated preferences and exhaust their budgets. With
multi-personhouseholdsrather thanindividualsparticipatingin the market, thisphenomenonis more
likely, however. Namely, a household with negative intra-household externalities may have a bliss
point despite the fact that each household member has monotonic preferences with respect to her
individual consumption. Just imagine a household composed of two smokers. Each household
member may individuallyprefer toalwayssmokemore, sincetheadditionalnicotineintakemorethan
compensates for the deteriorationof air qualityit causes. Nevertheless, the negative externalities due
to air pollutioncan be such that the two smokers agree on an unconstrained“optimum” consumption
for the household. Examples 3.3 – 3.5 below aim to capture such a situation.
It is not too surprisingthat certain externalities lead to sub-optimalequilibrium allocations. More
importantly, we can identify externalities that do not hinder Pareto-optimality of equilibrium out-
comes: Each household, by internalizingits intra-householdexternalities, furthers global efﬁciency.2
The positive issue is individual decentralization: Does competitive exchange among households
leadtooutcomesthatcanalsobeattainedviacompetitiveexchangeamongindividuals? Inotherwords:
Given a competitive equilibriumallocationwith only householdsparticipatingin the market, can this
allocation also be attained as a competitive equilibrium allocation where the individual household
members participate in the market — after being allottedsuitable income or endowment shares? The
answer is in the afﬁrmative in the absence of any externalities and with standard monotonicity and
smoothness conditions.
When intra-household externalities are present, individual d ecentralization of equilibrium out-
comes among households is still possible in exceptional cases. But as a rule, individual market
participants do not fully internalize intra-household externalities whereas a household does it by
assumption.1
We set out to address both issues, optimality and individual d ecentralization, i nac l o s e dm o d e l
of a pure exchange economy. Our ﬁndings with regard to individual decentralization are potentially
helpfulinansweringthequestionwhethertestscanbedesignedwhichdiscriminatebetweenequilibria
among households and equilibria among individuals. In the next section, we describe the model and
present general results for economies where intra-householdexternalities are absent or non-negative.
Section 3 containsvariousexamples with non-positiveintra-householdexternalities. In Section 4, we
summarize and assess our formal results. Elaborate proofs, of Propositions 2 and 3, are postponed
until Section 5.
1Needless to say that if an allocation cannot be supported by an impersonal market price system, it may well be
supportable by means of personalizedprices in the senseof Lindahl.3
2 MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
We consider a pure exchange economy composed of ﬁnitely many households h =1 ;:::;H .
The commodity space is IR ` with `  1. Household h is endowed with a commodity bundle
!h 2 IR `;! h > 0.
Each household h consists of ﬁnitely many members i = hm with m =1 ;:::;M (h);M (h)  1.
Put I = fhm : h =1 ;:::;H ;m =1 ;:::;M (h)g. A generic individual i = hm 2 I has:
 consumptionset Xi =I R `
+;
 preferences i on the allocation space X
Q
j2I Xj represented by a utility function Ui :
X− ! IR.
Letx =( xi);y =( yi)denotegenericelementsofX.F o r h =1 ;:::;H ,deﬁne Xh =
QM(h)
n=1 Xhn
with generic elements xh =( xh1;:::;x hM(h)).I f x 2X is an allocation, then for h =1 ;:::;H ,
household consumption is xh =( xh1;:::;x hM(h)) 2X h. For the economy with social endowment
! =
P
h !h and consumers i = hm (h =1 ;:::;H ;m =1 ;:::;M (h)),
a Pareto-optimal allocation(PO)is deﬁned in the standard fashion:
x =( xi) 2X is a Pareto-optimal allocation,i f
(i)
P
i xi = !;
(ii) there is no y =( yi) 2X with
P
i yi = !;
Ui(y)  Ui(x) for all i;
Ui(y) >U i(x) for some i.
Theﬁrst welfaretheoremassertsthatany competitiveequilibriumallocationinthesenseof Walras
is Pareto-optimal. Here we allow for the possibility that instead of individual members, households
act collectively on the market. We shall assumeefﬁcient bargaining within households. The latter
means that a household h chooses an allocationat the Pareto frontier of its budget set, i.e. an element
of its efﬁcient budget set EBh(p) as deﬁned below.
We shall from now on restrict attention to the case where consumption externalities, if any, exist
only between members of the same household. That is,
(E1) Intra-Household Externalities: Ui(x)= Ui(xh)
for i = hm, x 2X .
We shall sometimes pay special attentionto the case of no externalities, i.e.
(E2) Absence of Externalities: Ui(x)= Ui(xi)
for i = hm, x =( xi) 2X .4
Now consider a household h and a price system p 2 IR `.F o r
xh =( xh1;:::;x hM(h)) 2X h;
denote








Then h’s budget set is deﬁned as
Bh(p)= fxh 2X h : p  xh  p  !hg:
We deﬁne the efﬁcient budget setEBh(p) by:
xh =( xh1;:::;x hM(h)) 2 EBh(p) IF AND ONLY IF
1. xh 2 Bh(p) and
2. there is no yh 2 Bh(p) such that
Uhm(yh)  Uhm(xh) for all m =1 ;:::;M (h);
Uhm(yh) >U hm(xh) for some m =1 ;:::;M (h).
A Competitive Equilibrium (among households) is a price system p together with an allocation
x =( xi) satisfying
(1h) xh 2 EBh(p)




Thusin a competitiveequilibrium, each householdmakes an efﬁcient choice underits budget con-
straint and markets clear. Efﬁcient choice by the household refers to the individualconsumption and
welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of the household. Classical
versions of the ﬁrst welfare theorem are based on the crucial property that each consumer’s demand
lies on the consumer’s budget set — which implies Walras’ Law. This property follows from local
non-satiationofconsumerpreferences. Asufﬁcentconditionforthelatterismonotonicityofconsumer
preferences. With the possibility of multi-person households and intra-household externalities, the
crucial property needs to be adapted. The modiﬁed property stipulates that each household’s choice
liesonthehousehold’s“budgetline”. Itwillbecalledbudgetexhaustion(BE). Condition(BE) makes5
theunderlyingargumentappearextremelytransparent,ifnottrivial. Itshouldbeemphasizedtherefore
that(BE) followsfrom standardassumptionsontheprimitivedataofthe model: Monotonicityinown
consumption (MON) and Non-Negative Externalities (NNE) combined yield (BE). To formulate the
latter properties, we need some more notation. Let i = hm 2 I be any individual. Whereas xhm
denotes the individual’s private consumption bundle, xh;−m stands for the consumption plans of all
the other members of household h;i ta s s u m e st h ef o r m xh;−m =( xhn)n6=m.
Further, consider any L 2 IN , a =( a1;:::;a L);b =( b1;:::;b L) 2 IR L,a n d f :I R L ! IR .
By a  b, we mean al  bl for all l =1 ;:::;L .B y a  b we mean al >b l for all l. Finally,
a>b stands for a  b;a 6= b. The function f is called non-decreasing, if for any a;b 2 IR L, a  b
implies f(a)  f(b). It is increasing, if for any a;b 2 IR L, a  b implies f(a) >f (b). It is strictly
increasing, if for any a;b 2 IR L, a>b implies f(a) >f (b). Now various properties of individual
preferences can be unambiguouslydeﬁned.
(BE) Budget Exhaustion: For each household h =1 ;:::;H , any household consumption proﬁle
xh 2X h, and any price systemp 2 IR `,
xh 2 EBh(p) ) p  xh = p  !h
(MON) Monotonicity: Ui(xhm;x h;−m) is increasing in xhm
for all i = hm 2 I.
Strict Monotonicity: Ui(xhm;x h;−m) is strictly increasing in xhm
for all i = hm 2 I.
(NNE) Non-NegativeExternalities: Ui(xhm;x h;−m) is non-decreasing in xh;−m
for all i = hm 2 I.
A routine argument establishes the ﬁrst welfare theorem in our context. The ﬁrst welfare theorem is
also an immediate consequence of Proposition3 below.
Proposition 1 (First Welfare Theorem) Suppose (E1) and (BE).
If (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium,then x is a Pareto-optimalallocation.
Corollary 1 Suppose (E1), (MON) and (NNE).
If (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium,then x is a Pareto-optimalallocation.
Corollary 2 Suppose (E2) and (MON).
If (p;x) is a competitive equilibriumthen x is a Pareto-optimalallocation.
The last result can be sharpened, if the ﬁrst order approach can be employed.6
Proposition 2 (Optimality and Decentralization) Suppose (E2) and strict monotonicity of con-
sumer preferences. Suppose further that for each i 2 I, the utility function Ui is concave and in
the interiorof Xi differentiable.
If (p;x) is a competitive equilibriumwith x =( xi)i2I  0,t h e n
(i) x is a Pareto-optimalallocationand
(ii) (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium of the economy where the market participants are the
individuallyacting i 2 I, trading from the endowments xi.
To the extent that the second welfare theorem applies to economies satisfying (E2) and (BE), com-
petitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto-optimal and, hence, attainable as competitive equilibrium
allocations where the i 2 I act individually. Proposition 2 qualiﬁes this general d ecentralization
resulttotheeffect thatequilibriumpricesdonotdependonwhoparticipatesinthecompetitivemarket
exchange, householdsor individualhousehold members.
If(E1)and(BE),butnot(E2)aresatisﬁed,thencompetitiveequilibriumallocationsarestillPareto-
optimal (Proposition1). However, as a rule, they cannot be individuallyd ecentralized (Examples 2.1
and 3.2). So the assertion of Proposition2(ii) need no longer hold.
The conclusion of Proposition1 can be generalized to a core inclusionstatement. To this end, we
introduce the notion of the H-core (household core) which reﬂects the fact that only households are
market participants.
Let G denote the family of non-empty subsets of f1;:::;H g.F o r G 2G ,d e ﬁ n e
C(G): = fi 2 Iji = hm for some h 2 G;m =1 ;:::;M (h)g:
C(G) is the coalitionconsistingof all the constituentsof all the householdsin G.
Deﬁnition 1 x 2X belongs to the H-core,i f
(i) x is socially feasible, i.e.
P
ixi = !;
(ii) there is no G 2G and (yh)h2G 2
Q
h2G Xh with:
1. ui(yh)  ui(xh) for all i = hm 2 C(G).






Proposition 3 (H-Core Inclusion) Suppose (E1) and (BE).
If (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium,then x belongsto the H-core.7
To exemplify the variouspossibilities,we shall impose twofurther restrictions: aggregate welfare
maximization by households (WM) and separable externalities (SEP). Examples 2.1 and 3.1 – 3.5
share these two properties.





(WM) Welfare Maximization: xh maximizesWh on Bh(p)
for h =1 ;:::;H .
(SEP) Separable Externalities: Ui(xhm;x h;−m)= ui(xhm)+
P
n6=m vi;hn(xhn)
for i = hm 2 I.
Given(SEP),(MON)amountstoincreasingfunctions ui;i 2 I,and(NNE)amountstonon-decreasing
functions vi;j for i;j 2 I with i = hm;j = hn;1  m;n  M(h);m 6= n.
Example 2.1 [Pareto-Optimality WithoutIndividualDecentralization]
Let ` =2 ;H =1 and M(1) = 2. We label the two consumers simply i =1 ;2 with generic
consumptionbundles (xi;y i) 2 IR 2
+.L e t !h = ! =( 2 ;3) 2 IR 2.













Then (p;x) isa competitiveequilibriumandthe allocation x is Pareto-optimal. But becauseof the
homotheticity of u1 = u2, individualconsumer demands are collinear and x cannot be individually
decentralized. Furthermore, it can be shown that each compe titive equilibrium among households
(p;x) is of the form x = x and p = t  p with t> 0. Hence x is the only competitive equilibrium
allocation among households. 8
3 NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
For an economy with negative intra-householdexternalities, the following four distinct scenarios are
mutually exclusive, but by no means exhaustive:
1.) The assertion of Proposition 2 persists, i.e. if (p;x) is a competitive equilibrium among
households, then x is Pareto-optimal and can be individuallydecentralized using the preva iling price
system p. This possibilityis illustratedby Example 3.1.
2.) Competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto-optimal, but cannot be individuallyd ecentral-
ized (with any market price system). This possibilityis illustratedby Example 3.2.
3.) Competitive equilibrium allocations fail to be Pareto-optimal, yet can be individually d ecen-
tralized. Examples 3.3 and 3.4 present such cases.
4.) Competitive equilibrium allocationsare not Pareto-optimal and cannot be individuallyd ecen-
tralized. See Example 3.5.
Incidentally, our examples demonstrate that Pareto-optimality and individual d ecentralizability of
competitive equilibrium allocationsamong householdare independent properties.
The subsequentExamples3.1 – 3.5all satify(MON), (SEP), and (WM). Theyconstituteinstances
of negative or, more accurately, Non-PositiveExterna lities(NPE). Thelatter property issymmetric to
(NNE):
(NPE) Non-PositiveExternalities: Ui(xhm;x h;−m) is non-increasing in xh;−m
for all i = hm 2 I.
Under (SEP), (NPE) amounts to non-increasing functions vi;j for i;j 2 I with i = hm;j = hn;1 
m;n  M(h);m 6= n.
Example 3.1 [Pareto-Optimality and IndividualDecentralization]
We assume (SEP), (MON), and (WM). Moreover, we assume coefﬁcientsi;j such that
vi;j = −i;juj.






Put hm =1 −
P
n6=m hn;hm.
Ifhm > 0forsomem =1 ;:::;M (h),thenhousehold hexhaustsitsbudget. Supposethisholdstrue
for all households. Then a competitive equilibrium allocation among households is Pareto-optimal
and can be individuallydecentralized.9
Example 3.2 [Pareto-Optimality WithoutIndidividualDecentralization]
Modify Example 2.1 as follows:
!h = ! =( 2 ;3),
v1;2(x2;y 2)= −x2,
so that (MON) and (NPE) hold. (WM) still implies (BE), since consumer 2 does not experience any
externality. Then (x1;y 1)=( 1 ;1);(x2;y 2)=( 1 ;2) maximizes Wh on Bh(p) where p =( 1 ;1).
This yields a competitive eqilibrium allocation for the household that is Pareto-optimal, yet cannot
be individually decentralized for the reasons given in Example 2.1. Moreover, any compe titive
equilibrium for the household takes the form p =( t;t) with t> 0, x = ((1;1);(1;2)) so that
x = ((1;1);(1;2))is the unique equilibriumallocation for the household. 
Failure of the classical ﬁrst welfare theorem regarding competitive equilibria with individual
marketparticipation(one-personhouseholds)occursalready,ifthereexistoneconsumer iwithlocally
non-satiatedpreferences and a second consumer j withsatiationconsumptionbundle x
j who is over-
endowed, i.e. whose endowment !j satisﬁes !j  x
j. In the presence of negative intra-household
externalities, a household may have a bliss point despite the fact that (MON) holds, that is each
householdmember has monotonicpreferences withrespect toher individualconsumption. Examples
3.3 – 3.5 demonstrate the possibility of such a household bliss point and a resulting inefﬁciency.
Example 3.3 exhibits an interior bliss point and a Pareto-improving transfer to a household not
exposed toexternalities. Example 3.5 presentsinstancesof interiorblisspointsandPareto-improving
transfers from a householdsuffering from negative externalities to another householdthat is partially
exposedtonegativeexternalities. Example3.4presentsinstancesof boundaryblisspointsandPareto-
improving transfers from households suffering from externalities to other households that may also
be exposed to negative externalities.
Furthermore, Examples 3.3 – 3.5 provide cases where (BE) is violated. A corresponding notion
of competitive equilibrium has to relax the social feasibility condition (2):
P
ixi = !. Accordingly,




Example 3.3 [Sub-Optimalityand IndividualDecentralization]
Let` =1 andH =2 . Therearethreeconsumers,simplylabelled i =1 ;2;3withgenericconsumption
bundles xi  0. Consumers 1 and 2 form a household denoted h which satisﬁes (SEP) and (WM).






Hence household h has a global bliss point x
h =( x1;x 2)=( 1
2; 1
2) wheras household k satisﬁes
(MON) without experiencing any externalities. Now let !h =2 and !k =1 .T h e n p> 0;x =
((1
2; 1
2);1) constitute the competitive equilibria among households — with free disposal. Whereas




Example 3.4 [Sub-Optimalityand IndividualDecentralization]
Consider the set-up of Example 3.1 with the followingproperties:10
 There exists a householdh with
hm > 0 for some m =1 ;:::;M(h).
 There exists a householdk with !k  0 and
kn < 0 for all n =1 ;:::;M(k).
 For all consumers i 2 I, i 6=0 .
Then a competitive equilibrium allocation x satisﬁes xk =0for a householdk as speciﬁed above, is
sub-optimal, and can be individuallydecentralized. 
Example 3.5 [Sub-OptimalityWithout IndividualDecentralization]
Add to Example 3.2 a two-person household k with endowment !k =( 4 ; 4) and bliss point bk =
((1;1);(1;1)).T h e np=( t;t) with t>0remains a (free disposal) equilibrium price system, with
equilibrium consumption xh = ((1;1);(1;2))and xk = ((1;1);(1;1)). This equilibrium allocation
among households is still unique. It is not Pareto-optimal and cannot be individually decentralized.
11
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
4.1 R´ esum´ e
Ourconclusionsareimmediateones,onceanadequateframeworkhasbeenputintoplace. Concerning
optimality, we ﬁnd that, by and large, competitive equilibria among householdsyield Pareto-optimal
allocations. Sub-optimality can occur, if individual consumer preferences are satiated or exhibit
negative externalities. Notice, however, that the latter type of consumer characteristics would im-
pede Pareto-optimal equilibriumoutcomes even more, if individualconsumers instead of households
participated in the market.
Regarding individualdecentralization,we ﬁnd that competitiveequilibriaamong householdsyield
allocations that can be individually decentralized, provided standard monotonicity and smoothness
propertiesholdand externalitiesare absent. Inthepresence of — positiveor negative— externalities,
individual decentralization of competitive equilibria among households is bound to fail — with rare
exceptions.
4.2 Testable Restrictions
McElroy and Horney (1981), Horney and McElroy (1988), and McElroy (1990) have developed
parametric models to discern testable properties of household consumption plans resulting from
cooperativebargaining.2 Recently,Snyder(1994)hasproposednon-parametrictestsbasedonrevealed
preference theory and quantiﬁer elimination techniques to achieve two objectives:
(a) Determine whether a sample of price-quantity data could have been generated at all as equi-
librium outcomes of some ﬁnite economy.
(b) Discriminate between data potentially generated by equilibria among households and those
generated by equilibria among individuals.
Regarding (b), our theoretical insights suggest that one can distinguish between two types of
models of ﬁnite pure exchange economies. A model is of the ﬁrst type, if individualdecentralization
of equilibriaamong householdsis possible. Then empirical data drawn from such an economy would
allow either interpretation: outcomes of equilibria among households and outcomes of equilibria
among individuals. Consequently, certain tests designed to discriminate between those two kinds of
outcomes would be rendered rather powerless, if not obsolete. The model economy belongs to the
second type, if individual decentralization is impossible. In that case, tests designed to discriminate
between equilibriaamong householdsand equilibria among individualspromise to have more bite.
4.3 Addendum: The Neoclassical Household
Like the literature, we distinguishbetween (I) equilibriaamong householdsand (II) equilibriaamong
individuals. Apart from terminology and minor technical details, there exist no drastic conceptual
2See also the critique by Chiappori (1988b) and the reply by McElroy and Horney (1990).12
differences with respect to (II). Regarding (I), there are noticeable differences in concepts and em-
phasis. Chiappori (1988a) and in the sequel Snyder (1994) have employed the general notion of the
neoclassicalhouseholdwhereas McElroy andHorney (1981)and theirsubsequentworkfocus onthe
special case of Nash-bargained household decisions. A “neoclassical household” is a household h
that has a householdutilityfunction
Vh : Xh −! IR
and maximizes Vh on Bh(p) given any price system p. In contrast, our concept of an equilibrium
(p;x)among householdsrequires
(1h) xh 2 EBh(p)
where the deﬁnitionof an efﬁcient budget set EBh(p)restson individualutilityfunctionsUhm;m=
1 ;:::;M(h). Suppose both a household utility function Vh and individualutility functions co-exist.
Then a maximizer of Vh on Bh(p) cannot be expected to belong to EBh(p)or to be individuallyde-
centralizable, unless the householdutilityfunctionreﬂects individualwelfare of householdmembers.
Individualand householdwelfare may be linked via a social welfare function for the household,
Sh :I R M( h )−! IR
w h i c hi nt u r nd e t e r m i n e s
V h( x h)S h( U h 1( x h 1) ;:::;U hM(h)(xhM(h))):
If Sh is strictly increasing and the household satisﬁes (MON) and (NNE), then a maximizer
of Vh on Bh(p) belongs to EBh(p) and (BE) holds for this household. Furthermore, under the
latter circumstances, the assertions of Propositions 1 – 3 hold true. Special cases of (in the relevant
domain) strictly increasing social welfare functions for a household are a “Nash product”, giving
rise to a Nash-bargained household decision, and a “utility sum”, giving rise to aggregate welfare
maximization.
4.4 Further Qualiﬁcations
Our analysis is conﬁned to a formal setting similar to that of our short list of references which con-
stitutes the most closely related and relevant literature.3 Thus we disregard the local public goods
aspect of joint habitation and certain consumer durables, such as refrigerators, furnaces, microwaves,
dishwashers,washingmachines. Time and money savingsdue to joint shoppingand, more generally,
economies of joint household activities are ignored. On the other hand, conﬂict resolution within
householdsisfrictionlessbyassumption. In particular, time spentand resources expended onconﬂict
resolutionareneglected. Incorporatingsomeoftheseomittedfeatures,whileintriguingandimportant,
would exceed the scope and purpose of this inquiry.
3Let us point out, however, that most of the existing literature is concentrated on the particular case of one household
with two members and relies on the assumption of “egoistic” householdmembers, i.e. our assumption (E2).13
5 PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Assume consumer preferences and utility representations as hypothesized. Let (p;x) b eac o m -
petitive equilibriumamong householdswith x  0. Then (i) holds by Proposition1.
Now consider any household h =1 ;:::;H.
Since x  0,a l s ox h0 . Moreover, (i) implies that x is a Pareto-optimal allocation of the pure
exchange economy consistingof all the members of household h with social endowment
eh 
PM(h)
m=1 xhm. Because of
3 this optimalityproperty,
3 x  0,a n d
3 the hypothesizedproperties of the utilityfunctions,
there exist a vector q 2 IR `
++ and scalars γhm > 0;m=1 ;:::;M(h)such that
graduhm(xhm)=γ hm  q for m =1 ;:::;M(h).
Suppose there is no h > 0 such that q = h  p. Then for each m =1 ;:::;M(h), there exists a net
trade zhm 2 IR ` such that
xhm + zhm 2 Xhm;p  z hm  0;u hm(xhm + zhm) >u hm(xhm);
contradicting xh 2 EBh(p). Since householdh has been arbitrarily chosen, this shows that for each
i = hm 2 I, there exists i = h  γhm > 0 such that
grad ui(xi)= ip .
Yet the latter identities are the ﬁrst order conditions for an interior competitive equilibrium among
consumers i 2 I, with equilibrium price system p. Hence (ii). Q.E.D.14
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Assume (E1) and (BE). Let (p;x) be a competitive equilibrium — among households.
Suppose x does not belong to the H-core. Then there exist a family of households G 2G ,a
correspondingcoalition C(G),a n da( y h) h 2 G2
Q
h 2 GX hsuch that
1. ui(yh)  ui(xh) for all i = hm 2 C(G).






From 1. and 2. followsthe existence of a householdh 2 G such that uhm(yh)  uhm(xh) for all
m =1 ;:::;M(h)and uhm(yh) >u hm(xh) for some m =1 ;:::;M(h).
Since xh 2 EBh(p),
pyh >p! h
has to hold. In a similar way, the inequalityp  yg  p  !g for every g 2 G
follows from 1. combined with (BE) and xg 2 EBg(p).B u tt h e n
p
P
i 2 C ( G )y i=
P
h 2 Gpy h
>
P
h 2 Gp! h=p
P
h 2 G! h ,
contradicting3.. Hence, to the contrary, x belongs to the H-core. Q.E.D.15
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